A Game-Theoretic Account of Responsibility Allocation

Authors: Christel Baier, Florian Funke, Rupak Majumdar

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Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical In this paper, we provide a game-theoretic account of responsibility allocation in a multi-agent interaction setting. We model multi-agent interaction as a game of imperfect information in extensive form [Kuhn, 1953; Owen, 1995] between n individually rational players. Our key technical result is a relationship between forward and strategic backward responsibility: in a game of perfect recall, a coalition is forward responsible for an outcome iff it contains a strategically backward responsible coalition for every play with the outcome, and is minimal with respect to this property (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that all forms of responsibility of a coalition can be checked in polynomial time (Theorem 2).
Researcher Affiliation Academia Christel Baier1 , Florian Funke1 , Rupak Majumdar2 1Technische Universit at Dresden, Dresden, Germany 2Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Kaiserslautern, Germany
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any specific repository link, explicit code release statement, or mention of code in supplementary materials.
Open Datasets No The paper uses illustrative examples but does not refer to or provide access information for any publicly available or open dataset.
Dataset Splits No The paper does not describe any experiments that would require specific dataset split information.
Hardware Specification No The paper does not describe any experiments that would require hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper does not describe any experiments that would require specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper does not describe any experiments, thus no specific experimental setup details are provided.