A Strategy-Proof Online Auction with Time Discounting Values

Authors: Fan Wu, Junming Liu, Zhenzhe Zheng, Guihai Chen

AAAI 2014 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Experimental We have implemented our design of online auction with time discounting values (named OASES in the evaluation), and compare its performance with the off-line VCG mechanism (named Off-line VCG in the evaluation)...Our numerical results show that our design achieves good performance in terms of social welfare, revenue, average winning delay, and average valuation loss.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Fan Wu, Junming Liu, Zhenzhe Zheng, and Guihai Chen Shanghai Key Laboratory of Scalable Computing and Systems Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China {wu-fan, liu-jm, zhengzhenzhe, chen-gh}@sjtu.edu.cn
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 Item allocation algorithm: Alloc(t, Nt) and Algorithm 2 Locating Candidate Winning Slots: Candi(i).
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating that the source code for the described methodology is publicly available.
Open Datasets No The paper describes generating synthetic data for evaluation: 'uniformly distribute the agents intrinsic valuations over (0, 1]'. It does not refer to a publicly available or open dataset with concrete access information (link, DOI, repository, or formal citation with authors and year).
Dataset Splits No The paper describes a simulation-based evaluation with generated data and does not mention training, validation, or test dataset splits or cross-validation settings.
Hardware Specification No The paper does not specify any particular hardware (e.g., GPU/CPU models, memory details, or specific cloud instances) used for running the experiments or simulations.
Software Dependencies No The paper does not mention any specific software dependencies, libraries, or solvers with version numbers that were used for the implementation or experiments.
Experiment Setup Yes In the evaluation setup, we vary the number of agents from 50 to 1000 with a step of 50, uniformly distribute the agents intrinsic valuations over (0, 1], and set the two discounting factors of an agent i to be Fi(t) = 0.9t ai and Di(t) = 0.05 (t ai). We vary the number g of items for sale in each time slot from 1 to 5 with a step of 2, and set the number of time slots to 100. All the results are averaged over 200 runs.