An Algorithmic Framework for Strategic Fair Division

Authors: Simina Brânzei, Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Ariel Procaccia

AAAI 2016 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of fairly allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classic cake cutting protocols are susceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic outcomes still guarantee fairness? To address this question we adopt a novel algorithmic approach, proposing a concrete computational model and reasoning about the gametheoretic properties of algorithms that operate in this model. Specifically, we show that each protocol in the class of generalized cut and choose (GCC) protocols... is guaranteed to have approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria, or even exact equilibria if the protocol s tie-breaking rule is flexible. We further observe that the (approximate) equilibria of proportional protocols... must be (approximately) proportional, thereby answering the above question in the positive (at least for one common notion of fairness).
Researcher Affiliation Academia Simina Brˆanzei University of California Berkeley simina.branzei@gmail.com Ioannis Caragiannis University of Patras caragian@ceid.upatras.gr David Kurokawa Carnegie Mellon University dkurokaw@cs.cmu.edu Ariel D. Procaccia Carnegie Mellon University arielpro@cs.cmu.edu
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1: A GCC protocol. ... Algorithm 2: A non-GCC protocol. ... Algorithm 3: Selfridge-Conway: an envy-free protocol for three agents.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating that the source code for the methodology described in the paper is openly available.
Open Datasets No The paper focuses on theoretical analysis and does not use or train models on specific datasets.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical experiments with training, validation, or test dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not report empirical experiments that would require specific hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and focuses on algorithmic frameworks and game-theoretic properties, so it does not list specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe empirical experiments with specific setup details or hyperparameters.