An Experimental View on Committees Providing Justified Representation
Authors: Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier
IJCAI 2019 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Experimental | We provide an experimental study of committees that achieve (proportional/extended) justified representation (JR/PJR/EJR). In particular, we ask how many such committees exist and how varied they are in terms of voter satisfaction and coverage. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany 2AGH University, Krak ow, Poland |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper describes algorithms (like ILPs) but does not provide structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide explicit statements or links to open-source code for the described methodology. |
| Open Datasets | Yes | We focus on elections generated according to (a variant of) the impartial culture model and two Euclidean models [Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Enelow and Hinich, 1990]... We have tried different election types (not reported in the paper): the Polya-Eggenberger urn model [Berg, 1985], Euclidean elections with different distributions of the candidate and voter points, and various real-life elections from Pref Lib [Mattei and Walsh, 2013]. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper describes generating synthetic election data and using real-life elections but does not specify any training, validation, or test dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper does not specify the hardware used for running the experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper mentions using integer linear programs (ILPs) and Gurobi, but does not provide specific software names with version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | Yes | Unless specified otherwise, our elections have m = 100 candidates, n = 100 voters, and committees of size k = 10. We considered the following parameter values: 1. For a probability value p, under the p-Impartial Culture model (p-IC) each voter i approves each candidate cj independently, with probability p. 2. In the Euclidean model... In the r-Uniform Interval (r-UI) and r-Uniform Square (r-US) models, the candidate and voter points are chosen uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1] or from the square [0, 1] [0, 1], respectively, and each voter approves candidates within radius r. For each model of random elections and each parameter value, we generated 500 elections with 100 candidates and 100 voters each. |