Computing Nash Equilibrium in Interdependent Defense Games

Authors: Hau Chan, Luis Ortiz

AAAI 2015 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Experimental Our experiments show that our heuristic is more efficient, and provides better approximations, than best-response-gradient dynamics for the case of Internet games, a class of games introduced and studied in the original work on IDD games.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Hau Chan and Luis E. Ortiz Department of Computer Science, Stony Brook University {hauchan,leortiz}@cs.stonybrook.edu
Pseudocode Yes The pseudocode appears in the supplementary material.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide an explicit statement or link for the open-sourcing of the code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets Yes We perform experiments using our heuristic on Internet games, as introduced by Chan, Ceyko, and Ortiz (2012), and compare our results against that from best-response-gradient dynamics (BRGD), the heuristic used by Chan, Ceyko, and Ortiz (2012).
Dataset Splits No The paper does not specify dataset splits (e.g., train/validation/test percentages or counts) or cross-validation details.
Hardware Specification No The paper does not explicitly describe the hardware used to run the experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper mentions 'Student Version of MATLAB' but does not list multiple key software components with specific version numbers, nor does it name a self-contained solver or specialized package with a specific version number.
Experiment Setup Yes The heuristic starts by initializing all of the sites investment level xi to 0. It then updates the probability of attack for each site and increments the investment level of the site by a small amount (currently 0.001) for sites that do not satisfy the following condition: Ri yiˆpi +(1 i) P j2Pa(i) yj(1 xj)ˆqji. The algorithm terminates either when all of the sites satisfy the condition or when it reaches the maximum number of iterations. (See the supplementary material for details.)