Contest Design with Uncertain Performance and Costly Participation
Authors: Priel Levy, David Sarne, Igor Rochlin
IJCAI 2017 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | This paper studies the problem of designing contests... The paper provides a comparative game-theoretic based solution... The paper provides a comprehensive game-theoretic based analysis... As demonstrated numerically, the preference of the model to be used highly varies in the setting parameters. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Priel Levy and David Sarne Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University, Israel priel.levy@live.biu.ac.il, sarned@cs.biu.ac.il; Igor Rochlin School of Computer Science College of Management, Israel igor.rochlin@gmail.com |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper contains mathematical formulas, theorems, and proofs but does not include any pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating the availability of open-source code for the described methodology. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper uses a theoretical model with a uniform performance distribution and specific parameters (c1 = c2 = 0.16, c3 as independent parameter, M = 0.4, v0 = 0) for numerical illustration, which does not constitute a publicly available dataset. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper focuses on theoretical analysis and numerical illustration using a defined model. It does not involve experimental data that would require train/validation/test dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper describes theoretical models and numerical illustrations but does not mention any specific hardware used for computations. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper does not mention any specific software or programming language versions used for its analysis or numerical illustrations. |
| Experiment Setup | Yes | The setting used includes three agents, where c1 = c2 = 0.16 and c3 is the independent parameter. All three agents are characterized by a uniform performance distribution function between 0 and 1 (i.e., f1(x) = f2(x) = f3(x) = 1 for 0 x 1 and zero otherwise). The prize to be awarded to the winner is M = 0.4 and the fallback performance is v0 = 0. |