Cooperation and Control in Delegation Games

Authors: Oliver Sourbut, Lewis Hammond, Harriet Wood

IJCAI 2024 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Experimental While our primary contributions are theoretical, we support these results by: i) empirically validating the bounds above; and ii) showing how the various measures we introduce can be inferred from data. In our experiments we define ν using c(u) = Es[u(s)] and m(u) = u 2 and limit our attention to pure strategies, due to the absence of scalable methods for exhaustively finding mixed ϵ-NEs in large games.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Oliver Sourbut , Lewis Hammond and Harriet Wood University of Oxford oly@robots.ox.ac.uk, lewis.hammond@cs.ox.ac.uk, harriet.wood@hertford.ox.ac.uk
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain any pseudocode or algorithm blocks. It focuses on theoretical definitions, propositions, and experimental validations without presenting specific computational procedures in pseudocode format.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement about releasing source code for the methodology or a link to a code repository.
Open Datasets No The paper mentions generating 'random delegation games' for experiments but does not use or provide access information for a publicly available or open dataset.
Dataset Splits No The paper describes generating 'random delegation games' for empirical validation, stating, 'At each step we generate 25 random delegation games (with approximately ten outcomes)'. However, it does not specify explicit training, validation, or test dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper does not provide any specific details about the hardware (e.g., CPU, GPU models, memory) used to run its experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper does not provide specific version numbers for software dependencies. It mentions defining functions like ν and m, but not programming languages, libraries, or solvers with version numbers.
Experiment Setup Yes At each step we generate 25 random delegation games (with approximately ten outcomes), compute the set of strategies s such that w(s) wϵ + CC (w w0), wϵ + (w w0) where ϵ = 1 IC, and record the mean principal welfare over these strategies. In Appendix C.1 we include further details and plots for games ranging between 101 and 103 outcomes, with values of the fixed measures ranging between 0 to 1.