Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions

Authors: Yiling Chen, Biaoshuai Tao, Fang-Yi Yu

IJCAI 2021 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We prove it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium such that the project succeeds. We also identify two natural special scenarios where this decision problem is tractable. We then propose two algorithms to help cooperation in the game... We show that the cost to induce a cooperative Nash equilibrium is near-optimal for both algorithms.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Yiling Chen1 , Biaoshuai Tao2 and Fang-Yi Yu1 1Harvard University 2John Hopcroft Center for Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University yiling@seas.harvard.edu, bstao@sjtu.edu.cn, fangyiyu@seas.harvard.edu
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 Approximation algorithm for pivotal participation game with external investment; Algorithm 2 Approximation algorithm for pivotal participation game with matching funds
Open Source Code No A full version of this paper is available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/ 2105.08572. Yiling Chen and Fang-Yi Yu are supported by the National Science Foundation under grants IIS 2007887. No mention of open-source code for the described methodology was found.
Open Datasets No This paper is theoretical and does not involve the use of datasets, public or otherwise.
Dataset Splits No This paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments involving dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No This paper is theoretical and does not describe any experiments that would require hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No This paper is theoretical and does not provide details on software dependencies or specific version numbers.
Experiment Setup No This paper is theoretical and does not detail an experimental setup or hyperparameters.