Efficient Regret Minimization in Non-Convex Games

Authors: Elad Hazan, Karan Singh, Cyril Zhang

ICML 2017 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and generalizes offline guarantees for convergence to an approximate local optimum. We give gradient-based methods that achieve optimal regret, which in turn guarantee convergence to equilibrium in this framework.
Researcher Affiliation Academia 1Computer Science, Princeton University. Correspondence to: Elad Hazan <ehazan@princeton.edu>, Karan Singh <karans@princeton.edu>, Cyril Zhang <cyril.zhang@princeton.edu>.
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 Time-smoothed online gradient descent; Algorithm 2 Time-smoothed online gradient descent with stochastic gradient oracles; Algorithm 3 Time-smoothed online Newton method; Algorithm 4 Time-smoothed game simulation.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating the availability of open-source code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments performed on specific datasets. It discusses theoretical constructs like "loss functions f1, . . . , f T" and a "convex decision set K Rn".
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not conduct empirical experiments, thus no training, validation, or test dataset splits are mentioned.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any specific hardware used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not mention specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe specific experimental setup details, such as hyperparameters or training configurations for empirical evaluations.