Emergence of Social Punishment and Cooperation through Prior Commitments
Authors: The Anh Han
AAAI 2016 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Experimental | All the analysis and numerical results in this paper (see next section) are obtained using evolutionary game theory (EGT) methods for finite populations (Nowak et al. 2004; Imhof, Fudenberg, and Nowak 2005). |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | The Anh Han School of Computing and Digital Futures Institute Teesside University, UK |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper includes mathematical formulations and payoff matrices but no pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any links to open-source code for the described methodology or state that code will be made available. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper uses evolutionary game theory simulations rather than traditional datasets. It refers to game frameworks like 'Prisoner’s Dilemma' and 'finite populations' but does not provide access information for a public dataset. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper uses simulations based on evolutionary game theory. It does not describe traditional dataset splits such as training, validation, or testing sets. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper does not explicitly describe any specific hardware used for running its experiments (e.g., CPU, GPU models, or cloud resources). |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper mentions using 'evolutionary game theory (EGT) methods' and 'Markov Chain' but does not specify any software names with version numbers (e.g., programming languages, libraries, or solvers). |
| Experiment Setup | Yes | Parameters: T = 4, R = 3, P = 0, S = 1; ϵ1 = ϵ2 = 1, δ1 = δ2 = 3; β = 0.1; population size N = 100. ... The average result is very similar to what was observed in Figure 1. When commitment is not an option (Figure 2a), the cooperation frequency is very low (8% on average), with no sample having more than 50% of cooperation. When punishment is not available (Figure 2b), cooperation is more frequent (41% on average), but defection is also prevalent (59% on average). In 45% of the samples there is more than 50% of cooperation. Finally, when both options are present (Figure 2c), a significantly higher level of cooperation is achieved (65% on average), with 75% of the samples having more than 50% of cooperation. |