Envy-Free Division of Sellable Goods

Authors: Jeremy Karp, Aleksandr Kazachkov, Ariel Procaccia

AAAI 2014 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We study the envy-free allocation of indivisible goods between two players. Our novel setting includes an option to sell each good for a fraction of the minimum value any player has for the good. To rigorously quantify the efficiency gain from selling, we reason about the price of envy-freeness of allocations of sellable goods the ratio between the maximum social welfare and the social welfare of the best envy-free allocation. We show that envy-free allocations of sellable goods are significantly more efficient than their unsellable counterparts. Theorem 3. For any c (0, 1], the MAX-EFS(c) problem is NP-complete. Theorem 4. MAX-EFS(1) admits an FPTAS; i.e., there is an algorithm that, for any ϵ > 0, returns an envyfree allocation X (which possibly includes cash) such that SW(X, v A, v B) (1 ϵ) OPTEFS(v A, v B), and runs in polynomial time in the parameters of the problem and 1/ϵ.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Jeremy Karp Tepper School of Business Carnegie Mellon University jkarp@andrew.cmu.edu Aleksandr M. Kazachkov Tepper School of Business Carnegie Mellon University akazachk@cmu.edu Ariel D. Procaccia Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University arielpro@cs.cmu.edu
Pseudocode No The paper describes algorithmic approaches in prose, but does not include structured pseudocode or clearly labeled algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not contain any statement about releasing open-source code for the described methodology, nor does it provide any links to a code repository.
Open Datasets No This is a theoretical paper that does not use publicly available datasets for empirical experiments.
Dataset Splits No This is a theoretical paper and therefore does not include information about dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No This is a theoretical paper and does not report on experiments requiring specific hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No This is a theoretical paper and does not list specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No This is a theoretical paper and does not include details on experimental setup, hyperparameters, or system-level training settings.