Individual-Based Stability in Hedonic Diversity Games

Authors: Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind1822-1829

AAAI 2020 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Experimental We complement our theoretical results by empirical analysis, comparing the IS outcomes found by our algorithm, the algorithm of Bredereck et al. and a natural better-response dynamics. In Section 6, we empirically compare the outcomes produced (1) by our algorithm for finding individually stable outcomes, (2) by the algorithm of Bredereck et al. and (3) by a natural better-response dynamics with respect to several measures, such as the average social welfare and the diversity of resulting groups.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Niclas Boehmer TU Berlin Berlin, Germany niclas.boehmer@tu-berlin.de Edith Elkind University of Oxford Oxford, UK elkind@cs.ox.ac.uk
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 Computing an individually stable outcome
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating that source code for the described methodology is publicly available.
Open Datasets No The paper describes generating synthetic instances for its experiments (e.g., "For each s = 2, . . . , 50, we generate 1000 HDGs"), rather than using a pre-existing, publicly available dataset that requires access information.
Dataset Splits No The paper describes generating instances for empirical comparison of algorithms but does not specify training, validation, or testing splits of a dataset in the context of model training or evaluation reproducibility.
Hardware Specification No The paper does not explicitly describe the hardware specifications (e.g., CPU, GPU models, memory) used to run the experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper does not provide specific software dependencies (e.g., libraries, frameworks, or solvers) with version numbers that would be needed to reproduce the experiment.
Experiment Setup Yes Preference Models As Bredereck et al. s algorithm is only defined for single-peaked HDGs, we only use single-peaked instances in our analysis. We consider three intuitively appealing ways of sampling strict preferences over ratios that are single-peaked on Θ. Uniform single-peaked preferences (u SP)... Uniform-peak single-peaked preferences (up SP)... Symmetric single-peaked preferences (sym SP)... For each s = 2, . . . , 50, we generate 1000 HDGs with s red and s blue agents; thus, n = 2s takes even values from 4 to 100.