Learning Cooperative Games

Authors: Maria Florina Balcan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Yair Zick

IJCAI 2015 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given m random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the values of unseen coalitions? We study the PAC learnability of several well-known classes of cooperative games, such as network flow games, threshold task games, and induced subgraph games. We also establish a novel connection between PAC learnability and core stability: for games that are efficiently learnable, it is possible to find payoff divisions that are likely to be stable using a polynomial number of samples.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Maria-Florina Balcan and Ariel D. Procaccia and Yair Zick Carnegie Mellon University ninamf,arielpro,yairzick@cs.cmu.edu
Pseudocode No The paper describes algorithms and proofs in text but does not include any explicit pseudocode blocks or figures labeled as 'Algorithm'.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating that source code for the described methodology is publicly available.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not use or refer to specific publicly available or open datasets for empirical training or evaluation.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical data splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any specific hardware used for running experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not list any specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with specific hyperparameters or system-level training settings.