On the Approximation of Nash Equilibria in Sparse Win-Lose Games

Authors: Zhengyang Liu, Ying Sheng

AAAI 2018 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We show that the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium with a polynomial precision is PPAD-hard even for two-player sparse win-lose games (i.e., games with {0, 1}-entries such that each row and column of the two n n payoff matrices have at most O(log n) many ones). The proof is mainly based on a new class of prototype games called Chasing Games, which we think is of independent interest in understanding the complexity of Nash equilibrium.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Zhengyang Liu Shanghai Jiao Tong University lzy5118@sjtu.edu.cn Ying Sheng Columbia University ys2982@columbia.edu
Pseudocode Yes Figure 1: Construction of Gadget game (M[T], N[T]) , where T = (G, v1, v2, v3, v, c, w)
Open Source Code No The paper does not mention any open-source code release, specific repository links, or statements about code availability.
Open Datasets No This paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments using any datasets, therefore no dataset availability information is provided.
Dataset Splits No This paper focuses on theoretical proofs and does not describe any experiments that would require training, validation, or test dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No This paper is purely theoretical and does not include details on hardware used for experiments as no experiments were conducted.
Software Dependencies No This paper focuses on theoretical contributions and does not mention any specific software dependencies or their version numbers for experimental setup.
Experiment Setup No This is a theoretical paper providing mathematical proofs and reductions; it does not describe any experimental setup or hyperparameters.