Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition

Authors: Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti

ICML 2023 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem... For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees O(T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains O(T α) regret and O(T 1 α/2) violation for any α [1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.
Researcher Affiliation Academia 1Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy. Correspondence to: Federico Cacciamani <federico.cacciamani@polimi.it>.
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the full feedback setting
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any explicit statement or link regarding the release of source code for the described methodology.
Open Datasets No This is a theoretical paper and does not involve the use of empirical datasets for training or evaluation.
Dataset Splits No This paper is theoretical and does not conduct experiments requiring training, validation, or test dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not report on experiments requiring specific hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not report on experiments requiring specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or training settings.