Optimal Non-parametric Learning in Repeated Contextual Auctions with Strategic Buyer

Authors: Alexey Drutsa

ICML 2020 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We introduce a novel non-parametric learning algorithm that is horizon-independent and has tight strategic regret upper bound of Θ(T d/(d+1)). We also non-trivially generalize several value-localization techniques of noncontextual repeated auctions to make them effective in the considered contextual non-parametric learning of the buyer valuation function. ... Theorem 1. Let d 1, γ0 (0, 1), and A be the PELS algorithm with parameters set as in Eq.(3). Then, for any discount γ (0, γ0], distribution D, and feature vectors x1:T XT , the regret of PELS against the strategic buyer with a Lipschitz valuation v Lip L(X) is upper bounded: SRegret(T,A,v,γ,x1:T ,D) C(N0(T +N0)d) 1 d+1 ,
Researcher Affiliation Collaboration 1Yandex, Moscow, Russia 2Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia.
Pseudocode Yes The pseudo-code of PELS is presented in Alg. B.1 in Appendix B of Supplementary Materials.
Open Source Code No The paper does not explicitly state that source code for the described methodology is being released or provide a link to a repository.
Open Datasets No This paper is theoretical and does not conduct experiments involving datasets.
Dataset Splits No This paper is theoretical and does not conduct experiments or specify dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No This paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments, therefore no hardware specifications are mentioned.
Software Dependencies No This paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments that would require specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No This paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or system-level training settings.