Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Authors: Martin Bullinger, Chris Dong, Patrick Lederer, Clara Mehler
AAAI 2024 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | In this paper, we study the participation incentives of ABC voting rules. In more detail, we first investigate which ABC voting rules satisfy participation and prove that all ABC scoring rules (including all Thiele rules) even satisfy group participation. This generalizes the observation that scoring rules satisfy participation for single-winner elections and gives a strong argument in favor of Thiele rules. By contrast, we prove a general impossibility theorem, which shows that most ABC voting rules that sequentially compute the winning committees fail participation. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Martin Bullinger1*, Chris Dong2, Patrick Lederer2, Clara Mehler2 1Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford 2School of Computation, Information and Technology, Technical University of Munich martin.bullinger@cs.ox.ac.uk, chris.dong@tum.de, ledererp@in.tum.de, mehler@in.tum.de |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper describes algorithms (e.g., sequential Thiele rules, seq Phragmén, MES) conceptually and with mathematical notation, but it does not present any pseudocode or clearly labeled algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not contain any statements about releasing code for the described methodology, nor does it provide a link to a code repository. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical experiments using datasets for training. It discusses abstract profiles and voting rules. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical experiments with dataset splits for validation or testing. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any computational experiments that would require specific hardware. Therefore, no hardware specifications are mentioned. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any computational experiments that would require specific software with version numbers. Therefore, no software dependencies are mentioned. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and focuses on mathematical proofs and algorithmic properties of voting rules. It does not include an experimental setup with hyperparameters or system-level training settings. |