Repeated Multimarket Contact with Private Monitoring: A Belief-Free Approach
Authors: Atsushi Iwasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shun Yamamoto, Makoto Yokoo2038-2045
AAAI 2020 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other s actions (private monitoring or observation errors). There has been no game-theoretic support that multimarket contact facilitates collusion or not, in the sense that more collusive equilibria in terms of permarket profits exist than those under a benchmark case of one market. An equilibrium candidate under the benchmark case is belief-free strategies. We are the first to construct a non-trivial class of strategies that exhibits the effect of multimarket contact from the perspectives of simplicity and mild punishment. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | University of Electro-Communications, Kyoto University, Kyushu University, RIKEN AIP a2c.iwasaki@gmail.com, sekiguchi@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp, syamamoto@agent.inf.kyushu.ac.jp, yokoo@inf.kyushu.ac.jp |
| Pseudocode | Yes | Figure 1 illustrates EV, which is a variant of the well-known tit-for-tat strategy. A player first cooperates and keeps cooperation as long as she observes a signal suggesting cooperation. Once she observes a signal suggesting defection, she defects with a given probability and cooperates with the remaining probability. Similarly, when she defects, she keeps defection as long as she observes a good signal, she returns to cooperation with another given probability and defects with the remaining probability. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper is theoretical and focuses on constructing strategies and proving their properties. There is no mention of releasing source code for the proposed methods. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not use or reference any datasets for training or evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical experiments with data splits for training, validation, or testing. |
| Hardware Specification | No | As a theoretical paper, it does not describe or require any specific hardware for experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper focuses on theoretical game-theoretic analysis and does not specify any software dependencies or versions. |
| Experiment Setup | No | This paper is theoretical, developing strategies and proving conditions, and therefore does not include details of an experimental setup or hyperparameters. |