Notice: The reproducibility variables underlying each score are classified using an automated LLM-based pipeline, validated against a manually labeled dataset. LLM-based classification introduces uncertainty and potential bias; scores should be interpreted as estimates. Full accuracy metrics and methodology are described in Coakley et alK. L. Coakley, T. Snelleman, H. Hoos, and O. E. Gundersen, "The embrace of open science: An analysis of a decade of AI research and 56 800 conference papers," Under Review, 2026..
Repeated Multimarket Contact with Private Monitoring: A Belief-Free Approach
Authors: Atsushi Iwasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shun Yamamoto, Makoto Yokoo2038-2045
AAAI 2020 | Venue PDF | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other s actions (private monitoring or observation errors). There has been no game-theoretic support that multimarket contact facilitates collusion or not, in the sense that more collusive equilibria in terms of permarket profits exist than those under a benchmark case of one market. An equilibrium candidate under the benchmark case is belief-free strategies. We are the first to construct a non-trivial class of strategies that exhibits the effect of multimarket contact from the perspectives of simplicity and mild punishment. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | University of Electro-Communications, Kyoto University, Kyushu University, RIKEN AIP EMAIL, EMAIL, EMAIL, EMAIL |
| Pseudocode | Yes | Figure 1 illustrates EV, which is a variant of the well-known tit-for-tat strategy. A player first cooperates and keeps cooperation as long as she observes a signal suggesting cooperation. Once she observes a signal suggesting defection, she defects with a given probability and cooperates with the remaining probability. Similarly, when she defects, she keeps defection as long as she observes a good signal, she returns to cooperation with another given probability and defects with the remaining probability. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper is theoretical and focuses on constructing strategies and proving their properties. There is no mention of releasing source code for the proposed methods. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not use or reference any datasets for training or evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical experiments with data splits for training, validation, or testing. |
| Hardware Specification | No | As a theoretical paper, it does not describe or require any specific hardware for experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper focuses on theoretical game-theoretic analysis and does not specify any software dependencies or versions. |
| Experiment Setup | No | This paper is theoretical, developing strategies and proving conditions, and therefore does not include details of an experimental setup or hyperparameters. |