Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents

Authors: Jonathan Gadea Harder, Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik

IJCAI 2023 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We consider the existence and quality of equilibria and the complexity of maximizing social welfare. Additionally, we consider a bounded rationality model, where agents can only estimate the utility of a resource, since they only know the fraction of same-type agents on a given resource, but not the exact numbers. Thus, they cannot know the impact a strategy change would have on a target resource. Interestingly, we show that this type of bounded rationality yields favorable game-theoretic properties and specific equilibria closely approximate equilibria of the full knowledge setting. For the latter, we prove that equilibria always exist and that they can be constructed efficiently. Moreover, equilibria are guaranteed to exist for τ 1 2 for impact-aware agents. Also, we show that specific impact-blind equilibria resemble 2-approximate impact-aware equilibria, which ensures the existence of almost stable states for any τ in the impact-aware setting. Regarding the quality of equilibria, we prove tight constant bounds on the Po A for both versions and we show that the Po S is 1 for τ = 1. On the complexity side, we show that maximizing social welfare is NP-hard in general, but efficient computation is possible for restricted instances.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Jonathan Gadea Harder1 , Simon Krogmann1 , Pascal Lenzner1 and Alexander Skopalik2 1Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam 2Mathematics of Operations Research, University of Twente {jonathan.gadeaharder, simon.krogmann, pascal.lenzner}@hpi.de, a.skopalik@utwente.nl
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1: compute Equilibrium(G) 1 while Q not empty do 2 assign all a B with |X(a)| = 1; 3 q arg maxq Q |R Y (q)| |B assigned(q)|; 4 assign all a R Y (q) to q; 5 remove q and its assigned agents from G;
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide concrete access to source code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not use or reference any publicly available datasets for training or evaluation.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not describe dataset splits for validation or any other purpose.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experimental hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not list specific software dependencies with version numbers for experimental reproducibility.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experimental setup details or hyperparameters.