Notice: The reproducibility variables underlying each score are classified using an automated LLM-based pipeline, validated against a manually labeled dataset. LLM-based classification introduces uncertainty and potential bias; scores should be interpreted as estimates. Full accuracy metrics and methodology are described in Coakley et alK. L. Coakley, T. Snelleman, H. Hoos, and O. E. Gundersen, "The embrace of open science: An analysis of a decade of AI research and 56 800 conference papers," Under Review, 2026..
Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections
Authors: Théo Delemazure, Tom Demeulemeester, Manuel Eberl, Jonas Israel, Patrick Lederer
AAAI 2023 | Venue PDF | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We show that these two axioms are incompatible for anonymous party-approval multiwinner voting rules, thus proving a far-reaching impossibility theorem. The proof of this result is obtained by formulating the problem in propositional logic and then letting a SAT solver show that the formula is unsatisfiable. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1 Paris Dauphine University, PSL, CNRS, France, 2 Research Center for Operations Research & Statistics, KU Leuven, Belgium, 3 Computational Logic Group, University of Innsbruck, Austria, 4 Research Group Efficient Algorithms, Technische Universit at Berlin, Germany, 5 Technical University of Munich, Germany |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper describes voting rules like Thiele rules and Divisor methods but does not include any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | Yes | Firstly, we have published the code used for proving Proposition 1 (Delemazure et al. 2022c), thus enabling other researchers to reproduce the impossibility. [...] Delemazure, T.; Demeulemeester, T.; Eberl, M.; Israel, J.; and Lederer, P. 2022c. Supplementary material for the paper Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party Approval Multiwinner Voting . https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo. 7356204. Accessed: 2023-03-07. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper refers to |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper mentions |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper mentions that |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper mentions using |
| Experiment Setup | Yes | For committees of size k = 3, m = 4 parties, and n = 6 voters, this construction results in a formula containing 21, 418, 593 constraints... First, we specify that the formula encodes a function f on An SAT, i.e., for every profile A An SAT, there is exactly one committee W WR(A, k) such that x A,W = 1. For this, we add two types of clauses for every profile A: |