Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections
Authors: Théo Delemazure, Tom Demeulemeester, Manuel Eberl, Jonas Israel, Patrick Lederer
AAAI 2023 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We show that these two axioms are incompatible for anonymous party-approval multiwinner voting rules, thus proving a far-reaching impossibility theorem. The proof of this result is obtained by formulating the problem in propositional logic and then letting a SAT solver show that the formula is unsatisfiable. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1 Paris Dauphine University, PSL, CNRS, France, 2 Research Center for Operations Research & Statistics, KU Leuven, Belgium, 3 Computational Logic Group, University of Innsbruck, Austria, 4 Research Group Efficient Algorithms, Technische Universit at Berlin, Germany, 5 Technical University of Munich, Germany |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper describes voting rules like Thiele rules and Divisor methods but does not include any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | Yes | Firstly, we have published the code used for proving Proposition 1 (Delemazure et al. 2022c), thus enabling other researchers to reproduce the impossibility. [...] Delemazure, T.; Demeulemeester, T.; Eberl, M.; Israel, J.; and Lederer, P. 2022c. Supplementary material for the paper Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party Approval Multiwinner Voting . https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo. 7356204. Accessed: 2023-03-07. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper refers to |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper mentions |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper mentions that |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper mentions using |
| Experiment Setup | Yes | For committees of size k = 3, m = 4 parties, and n = 6 voters, this construction results in a formula containing 21, 418, 593 constraints... First, we specify that the formula encodes a function f on An SAT, i.e., for every profile A An SAT, there is exactly one committee W WR(A, k) such that x A,W = 1. For this, we add two types of clauses for every profile A: |