The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare

Authors: Simina Brânzei, Yiling Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Frederiksen, Jie Zhang

AAAI 2014 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We show that the Fisher market game always has a pure Nash equilibrium, for buyers with linear, Leontief, and Cobb-Douglas utility functions, which are three representative classes of utility functions in the important Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) family. Furthermore, to quantify the social efficiency, we prove Price of Anarchy bounds for the game when the utility functions of buyers fall into these three classes respectively.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Simina Brˆanzei Aarhus University, Denmark simina@cs.au.dk Yiling Chen Harvard University, USA yiling@seas.harvard.edu Xiaotie Deng Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China dengxiaotie@sjtu.edu.cn Aris Filos-Ratsikas Aarhus University, Denmark filosra@cs.au.dk Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen Aarhus University, Denmark ssf@cs.au.dk Jie Zhang Oxford University, United Kingdom jie.zhang@cs.ox.ac.uk
Pseudocode No The paper presents mathematical proofs and theoretical analysis but does not contain any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper is theoretical and does not mention releasing any source code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets No This is a theoretical paper with no experimental section or mention of datasets used for training.
Dataset Splits No This is a theoretical paper and does not describe any dataset splits for validation.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not report any experimental setup requiring hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not mention any software dependencies with specific version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup or hyperparameters.