Trading on a Rigged Game: Outcome Manipulation in Prediction Markets

Authors: Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das

IJCAI 2016 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We propose a new game-theoretic model that captures two aspects of real-world prediction markets: (1) agents directly affect the outcome the market is predicting, (2) some outcome-deciders may not participate in the market. We show that this game has two types of equilibria
Researcher Affiliation Academia Washington University in St. Louis {mithunchakraborty,sanmay}@wustl.edu
Pseudocode No The paper describes a game-theoretic model and its analysis but does not include any pseudocode or clearly labeled algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not contain any statement about releasing source code for the described methodology, nor does it provide a link to a code repository.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not use or provide access information for any publicly available or open datasets for training or evaluation.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical experiments with data, thus it does not provide details on training, validation, or test dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe running experiments; therefore, it does not provide any specific hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any implemented system or experiments that would require specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and models a game, but it does not describe an empirical experimental setup with concrete hyperparameter values or training configurations.