A Characterization of n-Player Strongly Monotone Scheduling Mechanisms
Authors: Annamaria Kovacs, Angelina Vidali
IJCAI 2015 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | Our work deals with the important problem of globally characterizing truthful mechanisms where players have multi-parameter, additive valuations, like scheduling unrelated machines or additive combinatorial auctions. We characterize truthful mechanisms for n players and 2 tasks or items, as either task-independent, or a player-grouping minimizer, a new class of mechanisms we discover, which generalizes affine minimizers. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Annam aria Kov acs Department of Informatics Goethe University, Frankfurt M., Germany. panni@cs.uni-frankfurt.de; Angelina Vidali Pierre and Marie Curie University, UPMC-LIP6, France. Angelina.Vidali@lip6.fr |
| Pseudocode | No | No structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks were found in the paper. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide an explicit statement or link to open-source code for the described methodology. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe training on a dataset. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe dataset splits for validation. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments, thus no hardware specifications are provided. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments or software dependencies with specific version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or training configurations. |