Approval-Based Apportionment
Authors: Markus Brill, Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Kai Wilker1854-1861
AAAI 2020 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | First, we prove that committee monotonicity is compatible with extended justified representation (a representation axiom proposed by Aziz et al. 2017) by providing a rule that satisfies both properties. Second, we show that the core of an approval-based apportionment problem is always nonempty and that core-stable committees can be found in polynomial time. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1Technische Universit at Berlin, Chair of Efficient Algorithms 2Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper does not contain structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide concrete access to source code for the methodology described. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical studies or dataset usage for training. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical studies or dataset usage for validation. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe running experiments, therefore no hardware specifications are provided. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe running experiments, therefore no software dependencies with version numbers are provided. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe running experiments, therefore no experimental setup details are provided. |