Approval-Based Elections and Distortion of Voting Rules

Authors: Grzegorz PierczyƄski, Piotr Skowron

IJCAI 2019 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We extend the idea of distortion to approvalbased preferences. First, we compute the distortion of Approval Voting. Second, we introduce the concept of acceptability-based distortion the main idea behind is that the optimal candidate is the one that is acceptable to most voters. We determine acceptability-distortion for a number of rules, including Plurality, Borda, k-Approval, Veto, Copeland, Ranked Pairs, the Schulze s method, and STV.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Grzegorz Pierczynski , Piotr Skowron University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland g.pierczynski@gmail.com, p.skowron@mimuw.edu.pl
Pseudocode No The paper describes voting rules in text, but does not provide structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper references a technical report on arXiv, but does not provide a direct link to open-source code for the described methodology.
Open Datasets No The paper operates within a theoretical metric model (e.g., E1 for one-dimensional Euclidean spaces) rather than using real-world datasets that would require training splits. No dataset access information is provided.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical data, thus no training/validation/test splits are mentioned or provided.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not discuss any hardware used for computations or experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not list any specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe an empirical experimental setup with hyperparameters or training configurations.