Better Strategyproof Mechanisms without Payments or Prior — An Analytic Approach

Authors: Yun Kuen Cheung

IJCAI 2016 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We use an analytic approach to derive strategyproof mechanisms which are more competitive than all prior strategyproof mechanisms. We improve the linear-program-based proof of Guo and Conitzer [2010] to show new upper bounds on competitive ratios. We provide the first compact proof on upper bound of competitiveness. In contrast to most of the prior work, we take on an analytic approach for the problem.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Yun Kuen Cheung University of Vienna, Faculty of Computer Science, Vienna, Austria yun.kuen.cheung@univie.ac.at
Pseudocode No The paper describes mathematical mechanisms and proofs but does not include pseudocode or clearly labeled algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link regarding the public release of its source code.
Open Datasets No This theoretical paper focuses on mechanism design and proofs, and as such, does not utilize or refer to publicly available datasets for training, validation, or testing.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical data analysis that would require train/validation/test dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not report on experiments that would require specific hardware for execution.
Software Dependencies No The paper mentions solving Linear Programs and using 'math software' but does not specify any software names with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe empirical experiments requiring details about hyperparameters or system-level training settings.