Blameworthiness in Strategic Games
Authors: Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao3011-3018
AAAI 2019 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games. In this paper we propose a complete logical system for reasoning about another form of responsibility that we call blameworthiness: a coalition is blamable for an outcome ϕ if ϕ is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent ϕ. The main technical result of this paper is a sound and complete bimodal logical system describing the interplay between group blameworthiness modality and necessity (or universal truth) modality. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Pavel Naumov Department of Mathematical Sciences Claremont Mc Kenna College Claremont, California 91711 pgn2@cornell.edu Jia Tao Department of Computer Science Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania 18042 taoj@lafayette.edu |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper does not contain any pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not mention providing access to source code. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper does not discuss the use of any datasets for training. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper does not discuss training/validation/test dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper does not mention any hardware specifications used for experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper does not mention any specific software dependencies with version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper does not provide details about an experimental setup or hyperparameters. |