Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets
Authors: Weiwei Wu, Xiang Liu, Minming Li
IJCAI 2018 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | Our main contribution is a random mechanism that guarantees various desired theoretical guarantees like the budget feasibility, the truthfulness on the sellers side and the buyers side simultaneously, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers. In this work, we address the budget-feasible procurement problem in two-sided markets. We investigate the model where items have heterogeneous values. Our main contribution is a randomized mechanism that guarantees desired theoretical properties like the budget feasibility, individual rationality, truthfulness both on the sellers side and the buyers side, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1 School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University, China 2 Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China weiweiwu@seu.edu.cn, liuxiangwork@gmail.com, minming.li@cityu.edu.hk |
| Pseudocode | Yes | Mechanism 1 General Random Mechanism GRM(B, b, V) Mechanism 2 Mechanism UNIFORMMECH(B,b,V) Mechanism 3 Mechanism GREEDYMECH(B, b, V) |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide concrete access to source code (e.g., a specific repository link, explicit code release statement, or code in supplementary materials) for the methodology described. |
| Open Datasets | No | This is a theoretical paper focusing on mechanism design and does not involve the use of datasets for training or evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not involve experiments or dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | This is a theoretical paper that presents mechanism design and mathematical proofs; it does not describe experimental setups requiring specific hardware. |
| Software Dependencies | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not describe experiments that would require specific software dependencies with version numbers for reproducibility. |
| Experiment Setup | No | This is a theoretical paper focused on mechanism design and mathematical analysis, and thus does not include details on experimental setup or hyperparameters. |