Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth

Authors: Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Guangda Huzhang, Biaoshuai Tao, Jiajun Wu

IJCAI 2017 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We show that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism exists in the connected piece scenario, and the same impossibility result for the general setting with some additional mild assumptions on the allocations. Finally, we study a large market model where the economy is replicated and demonstrate that truth-telling converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Researcher Affiliation Academia School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University xhbei@ntu.edu.sg, ningc@ntu.edu.sg, ghuzhang001@e.ntu.edu.sg, wuji0017@e.ntu.edu.sg Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan bstao@umich.edu
Pseudocode No No pseudocode or algorithm block found.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link for open-source code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not involve the use of datasets for training or evaluation.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve data splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experimental hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not list software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experimental setup details or hyperparameters.