Ceteris paribus majority for social ranking

Authors: Adrian Haret, Hossein Khani, Stefano Moretti, Meltem Öztürk

IJCAI 2018 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals or objects given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution from classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.
Researcher Affiliation Academia 1 TU Wien, Institut f ur Logic and Computation 192-02, Favoritenstraße 9-11, 1040 Wien, Austria 2 Universit e Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, LAMSADE, Place du Mar echal de Lattre de Tassigny, F-75775 Paris cedex 16, France
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain any pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not mention providing open-source code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets No This is a theoretical paper; it provides illustrative examples but does not use datasets for training, validation, or testing.
Dataset Splits No This is a theoretical paper and does not involve training, validation, or test splits of data.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not mention any hardware specifications used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not mention any specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup details such as hyperparameters or training configurations.