Characterising the Manipulability of Boolean Games

Authors: Paul Harrenstein, Paolo Turrini, Michael Wooldridge

IJCAI 2017 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical In this paper we close this problem, giving a complete characterisation of those mechanisms that can induce a set of outcomes of the game to be exactly the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.Our characterisations reduce to the presence of cycles of possible (that is, initial) deviations in some fully separated subsets of outcomes.For reasons of space, we will omit some of the easier proofs.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Paul Harrenstein University of Oxford United Kingdom paul.harrenstein@cs.ox.ac.uk Paolo Turrini Imperial College London United Kingdom paolo.turrini@imperial.ac.uk Michael Wooldridge University of Oxford United Kingdom mjw@cs.ox.ac.uk
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any concrete access information (e.g., repository link, explicit statement of code release) for source code related to the described methodology.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not use or refer to any datasets.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve experimental validation or dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not mention any specific hardware used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup details or hyperparameters.