Communication, Distortion, and Randomness in Metric Voting

Authors: David Kempe2087-2094

AAAI 2020 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We show that any one-round deterministic voting mechanism in which each voter communicates only the candidates she ranks in a given set of k positions must have distortion at least 2n k k ; we give a mechanism achieving an upper bound of O(n/k), which matches the lower bound up to a constant.
Researcher Affiliation Academia David Kempe University of Southern California
Pseudocode No The paper describes algorithms in prose, such as 'The mechanism M is as follows...' or 'Return the first choice of a uniformly random voter', but does not present them in formal pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not contain any explicit statements or links indicating that source code for the described methodology is publicly available.
Open Datasets No This is a theoretical paper and does not involve the use of datasets, training, or empirical evaluation.
Dataset Splits No This is a theoretical paper and does not involve the use of datasets or their splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No This is a theoretical paper and does not discuss hardware specifications used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No This is a theoretical paper and does not mention software dependencies with specific version numbers.
Experiment Setup No This is a theoretical paper and does not provide experimental setup details or hyperparameters.