Discrete Two Player All-Pay Auction with Complete Information
Authors: Marcin Dziubiński, Krzysztof Jahn
IJCAI 2023 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We show that equilibria are not unique in general but they are interchangeable and sets of equilibrium strategies are convex. We also show that equilibrium payoffs are unique, unless valuation of at least one of the players is an even integer number. If equilibrium payoffs are not unique, continuum of equilibrium payoffs are possible. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Marcin Dziubi nski1 and Krzysztof Jahn2 1Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland 2Faculty of Mathematics and Information Science, Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper presents mathematical theorems and definitions, but does not include any pseudocode or clearly labeled algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any concrete access to source code for the methodology described. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not use or reference any datasets for training or evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve data splits for training, validation, or testing. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any computational experiments that would require specific hardware specifications. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not mention any software dependencies with specific version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or training configurations. |