Efficiency and Complexity of Price Competition Among Single-Product Vendors

Authors: Ioannis Caragiannis, Xenophon Chatzigeorgiou, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, George A. Krimpas, Nikos Protopapas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

IJCAI 2015 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We model the behaviour of buyers and vendors as a two-stage fullinformation game and study a series of questions related to the existence, efficiency (price of anarchy) and computational complexity of equilibria in this game. To overcome situations where equilibria do not exist or exist but are highly inefficient, we consider the scenario where some of the vendors are subsidized in order to keep prices low and buyers highly satisfied.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Ioannis Caragiannis, Xenophon Chatzigeorgiou, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos George A. Krimpas, Nikos Protopapas, Alexandros A. Voudouris University of Patras & CTI Diophantus
Pseudocode No The paper describes algorithms in prose (e.g., 'Candidate Price works as follows', 'Enumerate works as follows') but does not include structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper is theoretical and does not mention releasing any source code for its methodology.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not involve datasets for training or experimentation.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve dataset splits for validation.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any hardware used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not mention any specific software dependencies with version numbers for experimental replication.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or training configurations.