Envy-Free Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets

Authors: Bo Tang, Jinshan Zhang

IJCAI 2015 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical Our primary goal is to design auctions that maximize social welfare and revenue two classical objectives in auction theory. For this purpose, we characterize envy-freeness with budgets by proving several elementary properties including consistency, monotonicity and transitivity. Based on this characterization, we come up with an envyfree auction, that is both social-optimal and bidder-optimal for a wide class of bidder types. More generally, for all bidder types, we provide two polynomial time approximation schemes (PTASs) for maximizing social welfare or revenue, where the notion of envy-freeness has been relaxed slightly.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Bo Tang, Jinshan Zhang Dept. of Computer Science, University of Liverpool Liverpool, United Kingdom {Bo.Tang, Jinshan.Zhang}@liverpool.ac.uk
Pseudocode Yes Auction 1: Auction for Proportional Bidders and Auction 2: PTAS for Social-optimal Auctions (these are presented as algorithm blocks in the paper).
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link regarding the availability of open-source code for the described methodology.
Open Datasets No The paper presents theoretical results and does not use or refer to any publicly available datasets for training purposes.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not discuss dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not specify any hardware used for running experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not mention specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experimental setup details or hyperparameter values.