Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments

Authors: Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo

IJCAI 2018 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical Firstly, we formalize the credit accounts framework... guarantees approximate IC (see Definition 3.3) and ex-post IR (see Definition 2.4)... Finally, as a complement to the constructed credit account mechanisms, we show that the exact IC and the ex-post IR cannot be achieved simultaneously, unless the mechanism is trivial (Theorem 5.1). The third main result shows that DIC and EX-POST IR cannot be achieved simultaneously, unless the mechanism is trivial.
Researcher Affiliation Academia 1 Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University 2 Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, Shanghai University of Finance
Pseudocode Yes Mechanism 2.1 (Abstract direct mechanism). For each period t [T]: 1. Each buyer has a private estimation F i t and reports an estimation ˆF i t to the seller;... (Similar structured steps for Mechanism 3.1 and 3.4)
Open Source Code No No statement explicitly providing or linking to the source code for the methodology described in this paper was found.
Open Datasets No This paper describes theoretical work and does not use or reference any publicly available datasets for training or other purposes.
Dataset Splits No This paper describes theoretical work and does not involve dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No This paper describes theoretical work and does not mention any specific hardware specifications (e.g., GPU/CPU models, memory) used for running experiments.
Software Dependencies No This paper describes theoretical work and does not list any specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No This paper describes theoretical work and does not include details about an experimental setup, such as hyperparameters or training configurations.