Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees

Authors: Mengfan Ma, Mingyu Xiao, Tian Bai, Bakh Khoussainov

AAAI 2023 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We systematically study the model and design strategyproof mechanisms with nice approximation ratios and also complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results. Specifically, for one-facility and two-facility games, we provide upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratios given by deterministic and randomized mechanisms, with respect to the utilitarian and egalitarian objectives. Most of our bounds are tight, and these bounds are independent of the entrance fee functions.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Mengfan Ma, Mingyu Xiao , Tian Bai, Bakh Khoussainov School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China mengfanma1@gmail.com, myxiao@uestc.edu.cn, tian.bai.cs@outlook.com, bmk@uestc.edu.cn
Pseudocode No The paper contains mathematical formulations, theorems, and proofs but no pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement about releasing open-source code or links to a code repository for the described methodology.
Open Datasets No This is a theoretical paper and does not involve training models on datasets.
Dataset Splits No This is a theoretical paper and does not involve validation datasets or splits.
Hardware Specification No This is a theoretical paper and does not mention any specific hardware used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No This is a theoretical paper and does not mention any specific software dependencies with version numbers for implementation or experiments.
Experiment Setup No This is a theoretical paper and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or training configurations.