Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores with Surplus

Authors: Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta

IJCAI 2023 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We present a polynomial-time algorithm which gives EF1 and PO allocations with (n 1) surplus. We relax the notion of EFX slightly and define t EFX which requires that the envy from agent i to agent j is removed upon the transfer of any chore from the i s bundle to j s bundle. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that in the chores case for 3 agents returns an allocation which is either proportional or t EFX.
Researcher Affiliation Academia 1Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Germany 2Graduiertenschule Informatik, Universit at des Saarlandes, Germany 3University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 fair And Efficient(I); Algorithm 2 EFX-Identical
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating the availability of open-source code for the described methodology.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not conduct experiments with datasets, so no information about public datasets or their access is provided.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical evaluation or dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any empirical experiments that would require hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any empirical experiments that would require specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any empirical experiments with specific setup details like hyperparameters or training configurations.