False-Name Bidding and Economic Efficiency in Combinatorial Auctions
Authors: Colleen Alkalay-Houlihan, Adrian Vetta
AAAI 2014 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | Rather than a polynomially small welfare guarantee, we show that the VCG mechanism will provide a constant factor welfare guarantee even when a bidder uses pseudonyms, provided the degree of complementarity between the items is not particularly large. This characteristic is common in practice (Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg 2006). In fact, in many cases, such as bandwidth auctions, marginal valuations do not increase much with set size; thus, if complementarities exist, they are not too large and may be bounded in some way (Lehmann, Lehmann, and Nisan 2006). |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Colleen Alkalay-Houlihan and Adrian Vetta Mc Gill University colleen.alkalay-houlihan@mail.mcgill.ca; vetta@cs.mcgill.ca |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper does not contain any pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not mention providing open-source code for the methodology described. |
| Open Datasets | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not use or reference any datasets for training. |
| Dataset Splits | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not describe experimental validation or dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not mention any hardware specifications for running experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not mention any software dependencies with specific version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not describe any experimental setup details such as hyperparameters or training settings. |