General Opinion Formation Games with Social Group Membership
Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Diodato Ferraioli, Cosimo Vinci
IJCAI 2022 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We show that, despite its generality, our model always admits a pure Nash equilibrium which, under opportune mild conditions, is even unique. Next, we analyze the performances of these equilibria with respect to a social objective function defined as a convex combination, parametrized by a value λ [0, 1], of the costs yielded by the untruthfulness of the declared opinions and the total cost of social pressure. We prove bounds on both the price of anarchy and the price of stability which show that, for not-too-extreme values of λ, performance at equilibrium are very close to optimal ones. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1University of Salento, Italy 2University of Salerno, Italy 3Gran Sasso Science Institute, Italy |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper does not contain any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any statement or link regarding the availability of open-source code for the described methodology. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve the use of datasets for training or evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any validation dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not mention any hardware specifications used for experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not mention specific software dependencies with version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup details such as hyperparameters or training configurations. |