Group Wisdom at a Price: Jury Theorems with Costly Information
Authors: Matteo Michelini, Adrian Haret, Davide Grossi
IJCAI 2022 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We study epistemic voting on binary issues where voters are characterized by their competence, i.e., the probability of voting for the correct alternative, and can choose between two actions: voting or abstaining. In our setting voting involves the expenditure of some effort, which is required to achieve the appropriate level of competence, whereas abstention carries no effort. We model this scenario as a game and characterize its equilibria under several variations. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1Eindhoven University of Technology 2University of Amsterdam 3University of Groningen |
| Pseudocode | No | No pseudocode or algorithm blocks are present in the paper. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any statement or link regarding open-source code for the described methodology. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not use or mention any datasets for training. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any dataset splits or validation procedures. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not mention any hardware specifications used for experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not list any specific software dependencies with version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup details or hyperparameters. |