Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games
Authors: Alberto Marchesi, Stefano Coniglio, Nicola Gatti
IJCAI 2018 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We study Stackelberg games where the underlying structure is a congestion game. ... We show that, without further assumptions, finding an SE when the followers break ties in favor of the leader is not in Poly-APX, unless P = NP. Instead, under the assumption that every player has access to the same resources and that the cost functions are monotonic, we show that an SE can be computed efficiently when the followers break ties either in favor or against the leader. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1 Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, Milano, Italy 2 University of Southampton, University Road SO17 1BJ, Southampton, United Kingdom |
| Pseudocode | Yes | Algorithm 1: Algorithm computing an O/PSE of an SSSCG. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide concrete access to source code for the methodology described in this paper. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve training models on datasets for empirical evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve validation sets for empirical evaluation. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe specific hardware used to run experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not mention specific software dependencies with version numbers needed to replicate any experimental results. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or system-level training settings. |