Mechanism Design for Strategic Project Scheduling
Authors: Pradeep Varakantham, Na Fu
IJCAI 2017 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We make three key contributions with respect to designing mechanisms for the strategic RCPSP: (i) We formally define the strategic model and its objective. (ii) We then show that the well known VCG mechanism is not incentive compatible for the strategic RCPSP. (iii) Finally, we provide two mechanisms that build on VCG, namely SCP and ICP with strong theoretical properties. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Pradeep Varakantham and Na Fu School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University pradeepv@smu.edu.sg, nafu@smu.edu.sg |
| Pseudocode | Yes | Table 1: ALLOCPOS() |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any statements or links indicating that open-source code for the methodology is available. |
| Open Datasets | No | This is a theoretical paper focused on mechanism design and does not involve training models on a dataset. |
| Dataset Splits | No | This is a theoretical paper focused on mechanism design and does not involve dataset validation splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe any specific hardware used for experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper mentions that the model 'can be solved using solvers like CPLEX' but does not specify any version numbers for CPLEX or other software dependencies required for reproducibility. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with specific hyperparameters or system-level settings. |