Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade

Authors: Matthias Gerstgrasser, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Philip Lazos, Alexander Skopalik1973-1980

AAAI 2019 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. ... For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1 e) approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting.
Researcher Affiliation Academia 1,2,4Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford 3School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex 5Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente
Pseudocode No The paper presents theoretical proofs and theorems, but does not include structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any statement or link indicating the availability of open-source code for the described methodology.
Open Datasets No The paper discusses valuation functions drawn from probability distributions in a Bayesian setting, but does not refer to or provide access information for any publicly available or open datasets.
Dataset Splits No The paper does not describe any dataset splits (training, validation, test) as it is a theoretical work and does not involve empirical evaluation on datasets.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experiments that would require hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any software dependencies with version numbers for experimental reproducibility.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or system-level training settings.