Non-Myopic Negotiators See What's Best
Authors: Yair Zick, Yoram Bachrach, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key
IJCAI 2015 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We identify conditions that ensure that the socially optimal outcome is an ε-Nash equilibrium. We apply our results to some families of utility functions, and discuss their strategic implications. We formally prove this in a class of games called strategic negotiation games. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Collaboration | Yair Zick Carnegie Mellon University yairzick@cs.cmu.edu Yoram Bachrach and Ian A. Kash and Peter Key Microsoft Research yobach,iankash,Peter.Key@microsoft.com |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper does not contain structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide concrete access to source code for the methodology described. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments using datasets. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe experiments with dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not specify any hardware details used for experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not specify any software dependencies with version numbers for reproducibility. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe a specific experimental setup, including hyperparameters or system-level training settings. |