Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

Authors: Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti

ICLR 2024 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides e O(T 2/3) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Federico Cacciamani Politecnico di Milano federico.cacciamani@polimi.it Matteo Castiglioni Politecnico di Milano matteo.castiglioni@polimi.it Nicola Gatti Politecnico di Milano nicola.gatti@polimi.it
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 Online Information Acquisition; Algorithm 2 ESTIMATEPROB; Algorithm 3 COMMIT; Algorithm 4 ESTIMATECOSTS; Algorithm 5 Binary Search (BS)
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide an explicit statement or link indicating the availability of open-source code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not describe the use of any datasets for training or experimentation, hence no information about public availability of a dataset is provided.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical validation with datasets, so it does not mention training, validation, or test splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is purely theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup or hardware used for computation.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not detail any software dependencies with specific version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with specific hyperparameters or training settings.