Optimality and Nash Stability in Additive Separable Generalized Group Activity Selection Problems

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli

IJCAI 2019 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We completely characterize the complexity of computing a social optimum and provide approximation algorithms for the NP-hard cases. We also focus on Nash stable outcomes, for which we give some complexity results and a full picture of the related performance by providing tights bounds on both the price of anarchy and the price of stability.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Vittorio Bil o1 , Angelo Fanelli2 , Michele Flammini3,4 , Gianpiero Monaco4 and Luca Moscardelli5 1University of Salento, Italy 2CNRS, (UMR-6211), France 3Gran Sasso Science Institute, Italy 4University of L Aquila, Italy 5University of Chieti-Pescara, Italy
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any concrete access to source code for the methodology described.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical studies with datasets for training.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical studies with dataset splits for validation.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experimental work requiring specific hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not mention any specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or system-level training settings.