Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games

Authors: Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Anaƫlle Wilczynski5211-5218

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Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical In this paper, we study the convergence of simple dynamics leading to stable partitions in a variety of classes of hedonic games... We identify conditions for convergence, provide elaborate counterexamples of existence of individually stable partitions, and study the computational complexity of problems related to the coalition formation dynamics.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Felix Brandt1, Martin Bullinger1, Ana elle Wilczynski2 1 Institut f ur Informatik, Technische Universit at M unchen 2 MICS, Centrale Sup elec, Universit e Paris-Saclay, France
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any concrete access to source code for the methodology described, nor does it state that code is being released.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not involve the use of datasets for training or evaluation, therefore no public dataset information is provided.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not report on empirical experiments with dataset splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any specific hardware used for running experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not mention any specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any specific experimental setup details such as hyperparameters or training configurations.