Schelling Games on Graphs
Authors: Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Ayumi Igarashi, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
IJCAI 2019 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We investigate the existence of equilibria in these games, study the complexity of finding an equilibrium outcome or an outcome with high social welfare, and also provide upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy and stability. Some of our results extend to the setting where the preferences of the agents over their neighbors are defined by a social network rather than a partition into types. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | 1Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford 2Department of Mathematical Informatics, University of Tokyo |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper mentions a dynamic programming algorithm but does not provide structured pseudocode or an algorithm block. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any explicit statements or links indicating the release of open-source code for the described methodology. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical studies with datasets, therefore no training dataset access information is provided. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve empirical studies with datasets, therefore no dataset split information is provided. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe computational experiments, thus no hardware specifications are provided. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and does not specify software dependencies with version numbers, as it does not describe an implementation. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and does not describe computational experiments, therefore no experimental setup details like hyperparameters or system-level settings are provided. |