Selfish Knapsack

Authors: Itai Feigenbaum, Matthew Johnson

AAAI 2017 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We provide a randomized mechanism with attractive strategic properties: it has a price of anarchy of 2 for Bayes-Nash and coarse correlated equilibria. For overstating-only agents, it becomes strategyproof, and has a matching lower bound. For the case of two understating-only agents, we provide a specialized randomized strategyproof 5+4 2 7 1.522-approximate mechanism, and a lower bound of 5 5 9 2 1.09. When all agents but one are honest, we provide a deterministic strategyproof 1+ 5 2 1.618-approximate mechanism with a matching lower bound. The latter two mechanisms are also useful in problems beyond the one in consideration.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Itai Feigenbaum and Matthew P. Johnson Lehman College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York
Pseudocode Yes ALGORITHM 1: GREEDY Input: Sets of reported items R X n S , T i NRi while T = do next max T T T\{next} if s(S \{next}) 1 then S S \{next} else break return S
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide concrete access to source code for the methodology described. It links to an online appendix for proofs and additional results, but not source code.
Open Datasets No This is a theoretical paper that focuses on algorithm design and mathematical analysis, not empirical studies using datasets for training or evaluation. Therefore, it does not provide information about publicly available datasets.
Dataset Splits No This is a theoretical paper that does not involve empirical experiments requiring dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No This is a theoretical paper. It does not describe any empirical experiments that would require hardware specifications.
Software Dependencies No This is a theoretical paper that designs and analyzes mechanisms. It does not describe implementations of these mechanisms or empirical experiments that would require specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No This is a theoretical paper focusing on mechanism design and analysis. It does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or system-level training settings.